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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of 
mathematical modelling in urban studies and to stimulate a deeper debate about the 
use of models in planning. This is done by means of an identification of key 
assumptions made in the process of the interpretation of reality as a set of algebraic 
relations; assumptions which, it is argued, underlie virtually the whole of mathematical 
modelling but which appear never to be openly discussed. An example of the use of 
these assumptions is then given in the theoretical development of the logit model of 
discrete choice, and the paper is concluded with preliminary recommendations about 
the future development and use of the mathematical model. 
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Resumen 
El objetivo de este trabajo es contribuir a la comprensión del fenómeno de la 
modelación matemática en estudios urbanos y de estimular un debate más profundo 
sobre el uso de modelos en la planificación. Esto se hace por medio de una 
identificación de los supuestos básicos en el proceso de la interpretación de la realidad 
como un conjunto de relaciones algebraicas; supuestos que, se argumenta, la base de 
la práctica totalidad de los modelos matemáticos, pero que parece que nunca se 
discuten abiertamente. Un ejemplo de la utilización de estos supuestos se da entonces 
en el desarrollo teórico del modelo logit de elección discreta, y el documento se 
concluye con recomendaciones preliminares sobre el futuro desarrollo y el uso del 
modelo matemático. 
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1.- Introduction 
 
Much as in any aspect of social science, mathematical modelling has its enthusiasts 
and its sceptics. The enthusiasts accuse the sceptics of not understanding the models, 
and the sceptics in turn accuse the enthusiasts of not understanding the reality. As in 
the case of GIS therefore (Sheppard, 1995) the problem is perhaps not so much the 
rights and wrongs of modelling itself as the lack of communication between the two 
camps; to use the respective stereotypes, there are the intellectually insecure pseudo-
scientists versus the woolly-minded ignorants. 
 
A stumbling block in the debate is a certain confusion about what exactly is the 
phenomenon of modelling; opinions seem to range from those who believe it a means 
of justifying undemocratic decisiones but to not sure how, and those who believe it 
science but can’t say why. The aim of this paper is to stimulate this debate by 
examining the roots of the process of modelling, and suggest future directions for 
research in the field. As a critique of modelling of urban systems, the intention is not, 
as in the famous paper of Douglass Lee (1973), to write their "requiem" so much as to 
re-visit the basics (if ever they have been visited) before the probable boom in 
technical advance predicted by Openshaw (1995) materialises. This paper takes as a 
starting point a perspective more akin to that of Lee's less publicised contemporary 
Tribe (1972, page 77), who states that the accepted methodology has rested upon 
"purely 'objective' modes of relation between the observer and object of observation," 
this premise, "deriving in part from insecurity about the intellectual credentials . . . . . 
of social science". 
 
 
2.- Is modelling objective science? 
 
What is science? Of course this depends on whom one asks. Amongst modellers there 
is an implicit acceptance that it necessarily involves the use of mathematical 
description. Undeniably, the language of mathematics has its appeal. Once translated 
into this language, a description has properties which are independent of the observer; 
anyone who knows the language will be able to make the same deductions from the 
same description. However this property, of endogenous objectivity, is purely internal 
to mathematics - the interpretation of reality as mathematical structure per se cannot 
be said to be objective. Exogenous objectivity of this latter form, a property 
characteristic of 'hard' science, is not intrinsic to the mathematical language. The only 
case where it can be said to exist is when there exists a controlled and repeatable 
process of observation of the real phenomenon. This in itself has nothing to do with the 
use of mathematical language (except for the requirement that the language must 
possess a degree of internal rigour). The fact that this is possible within definable error 
for many natural systems does not infer the right to model any system at any level of 
complexity mathematically without such a process of observation, and claim 
objectivity. 
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This leads us to a useful definition of objective science for the purposes of this paper - 
that of a process of observation. One is not suggesting that other forms of science are 
less valid; there is an increasing body of work for example in urban systems 
(exemplified by Allen and Sanglier 1981, Batty and Longley 1989) which develops 
models as learning tools, without the same emphasis on predictive capacity. The issue 
here is not so much 'science or non-science' as the type of science to which modelling 
aspires. Much of the language used in modelling appears to suggest that this is 
predictive, objective science. Phrases such as "models improve knowledge of reality" or 
"much can be learned from model behaviour" slip easily off the pen, but need more 
careful consideration. Mackett (1993) and Openshaw (1995), amongst many others fall 
into this type of trap; language of this sort implies a definite deduction of reality from 
the model which requires a degree of objectivity in the induction from that reality. Any 
objectivity possessed by a model arises from the property that observations made are 
repeatable by any observer at any place or time within experimental error. 
 
One is given to asking how many models of urban systems are subjected to such 
criteria, and how many would stand up to them. The common disclaimer that one 
cannot apply the same degree of rigour to social systems is quite irrelevant; without 
the same degree of rigour one cannot employ the same methods nor the same 
language nor the same concepts with the same degree of liberty as modellers 
frequently do. The difference between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences is deeper than just 
the size of the error term (see below discussion). To pick examples at opposite ends of 
the scale, one might consider: 
 
(a) Models of traffic flow. Given that in a single lane of traffic, one is analysing a 1-
dimensional movement in which the human influence is observable only in terms of 
distance, speed and acceleration, and in which the emotional motivation is a relatively 
simple one, it may be possible to define appropriate limits of tolerance and to 
formulate a mathematical expression whose predictions may be falsifiable by 
observation falling outside those limits. 
 
(b) Models of land-use. It is difficult to imagine a series of controlled experiments with 
urban development which could confirm numerical laws of long-term land-use changes. 
The basic problem is that the typical time scale of the development is similar to the 
evolutionary time scale of the system itself. In such ontogenetic systems, where the 
very rules themselves evolve with the system, it is generally impossible even to define 
useful limits to quantitative behaviour on a macroscopic scale. In the absence of such 
limits, it is by definition impossible to verify a model by any experiment. 
     
Of course there exists a whole range of models within these two extremes, with 
varying degrees of verifiability. Given that there exist models of urban systems which 
are accepted and used (Klostermann, 1994), and which appear to be unverified in this 
manner, one must ask the question, "If not science, what?" 
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3. -So is it art? 
 
Continuing the theme of the process of observation, one might pause to consider as an 
answer to the above question the idea of art. In this instance, different qualities are 
valued in the observation of reality. Contrary to the observer-independence of science, 
an artistic interpretation is in general identified specifically with one person or group, 
and the more uniquely so the better. (One is here considering art in the contemporary 
Occidental egocentric interpretation.) The artist is expected to put their own distinct 
contribution to the work in a way that no other does, although their observation is 
expected to reflect some universal or common truth in human experience. If this 
contribution includes political or cultural bias, so be it. 
 
Acceptance of a work of art depends partly on this ability to invoke common intuition 
and partly also on certain peer group norms. These norms are not themselves fixed 
but evolve with innovation, technical advance and changing cultural environment. 
 
There are interesting parallels between this description of art and the dynamic of the 
modelling community. 
 
Whilst there are ideas of seeking universal qualities in the description of urban 
systems, there is also a great diversity of styles and individual interpretations, as 
Wegener (1994) and Webster et al (1988) demonstrate. This may be seen on the one 
hand as representing a positive creativity in approaches to a difficult problem, or on 
the other as evidence of niche-building, depending on one's point of view; however the 
fact that all these examples are considered legitimate efforts points to the existence of 
some form of peer group norms. Given that the relative looseness of empirical support 
removes an external point of reference, acceptance is much more dependent on the 
internal dynamic of the academic community and the language it employs. 
 
However, these parallels will only extend so far. An important difference is that in art 
there appears to be little consensus as to the existence of a fundamental, unassailable 
base from which all artistic activity is derived, as the ever more introspective extremes 
of postmodernism perhaps demonstrate. Mathematical modelling however contains an 
implicit, accepted interpretative foundation - the use of a common medium of 
expression (algebraic language) is in itself sufficient evidence of this. However this 
foundation, as far as the author is aware, has never been explicitly stated - hence 
perhaps the confusion over the status of modelling. The next section will attempt to 
remedy this by setting out three key assumptions common to almost all modelling of 
urban systems, which between them form that foundation. 
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4.- The three canons of modelling 
 
A.-If you can count it you can calculate it 
 
There can be no assumption more fundamental to algebraic modelling than this, which 
relates a form of observation to the very concept of number itself. Mathematically it is 
not in fact always true. 
 
Mathematically, the process of counting consists of creating a bijective map (a one-to-
one correspondence) between an observed set of objects and an abstract set of 
discrete, ordered symbols, thereby assigning to the observed set the cardinality 
corresponding to the ultimate symbol used in the abstract one. (Cardinality is the set-
theoretic term for the ‘size’ of a set.) In everyday terms this means, for example, that 
we count the fingers on one hand by assigning to each in turn a member of the set N 
= {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . . .} and when the fingers are exhausted taking the last-used 
member of N (usually 5) to represent the ‘number’ of fingers. However, one does not 
need to use the set N. Equally one could use {A, B, C, D, E, . . . .} or {glue, sporadic, 
knees, glbpht, dog-biscuit, . . . .} and the result (E or dog-biscuit) would be 
mathematically equally meaningful. The difference with the set N is that the symbols 
used have associated with them a spurious meaning due to their use in algebra. This 
meaning is derived from the fact that that there exists in algebra a set of relation 
between the symbols, which are defined by a set of 15 axioms. These axioms define all 
the commonly understood operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and 
division, and completely define the properties of the real number system. The real 
numbers themselves are defined by these relations and have no objective meaning as 
symbols outside of them. Now of these 15 axioms, only six suffice to define an ordered 
set of elements, basically those defining the relations of succession (symbolically <, = 
and >) which apply equally to any other ordered set such as those above mentioned as 
to the set N. The mere use of the symbols of the set N for counting does not allow one 
to infer the validity of the other 9 axioms, with all the algebraic relations they imply. 
 
Indeed this argument holds equally for any form of measurement other than counting. 
Given that any measurement has a finite precision, the process of measurement simply 
becomes one of counting the number of smallest observable increments. 
 
The unique justification for involving the other 9 axioms is when the relationships 
postulated can be confirmed by observation. 
 
A common example of this collapsing of a concept into a variable is the ‘benefit’ of 
cost-benefit analysis. In the evaluation of a road project for example, where benefits 
are associated with time savings, it is reasonable to suppose that for a given person at 
a given moment in time a quicker journey is preferable to a similar but slower one - 
implying an ordered relation between journey time and benefit. From this assertion, 
the assumption of calculability is deployed to create a numerical value of the ‘benefit’ 
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of an individual out of a phenomenon apparently displaying nothing more than an 
ordering property. 
 
An instance where one could justify the use of real numbers is in the use of indicators. 
If one uses a mapping between observation and number which preserves an ordering 
property of the former, one can use the indicator arrived at for comparison between 
cases (as comparison uses only the relations <, = and >). However, the moment one 
begins to calculate figures from the same number, the indicator becomes a variable, 
relationships involving which need to be justified. For example, one may use average 
L10 noise level as an indicator of acoustic pollution in an area, for purposes of 
comparison with other areas. If this figure is used to predict, say, house prices in that 
area however, there is immediately a more-than-ordering relation with other 
quantities. 
 
This assumption of calculability is the that upon which the entire process of modelling 
is founded. Given that this assumption has been made therefore, and that algebraic 
relations are to be employed, a second crucial assumption is then made: 
 
B.- It’s not what you leave out but what you put in that matters 
 
The second assumption relates to the obvious idea that what is left out of the model is 
either constant or negligible. This is an assumption universal to any form of model (if 
one builds a miniature replica of a building, one might assume that not reproducing 
every fibre in the carpets will not detract from the model’s usefulness) but in 
mathematical terms it has a specific interpretation. 
 
Taking a general form of model (one does not claim it to be the most general, merely 
to be illustrative) to be a relation of the type: 
xi = fi(x1, x2, x3, . . . xn, t) i = 1, . . . , m 
- two things are immediately obvious. One is that the choice of variables x1, x2, x3, . . . 
xn, t will determine the phenomena included in the model as a whole, the other is that 
for any given function fi, the arguments of that function will determine the possible 
interactions with the variables. These define the limits of the model. Everything not 
explicitly included is assumed disjoint, constant or negligible by default. It is this 
process of assumption by default which is the aspect of this assumption least often 
recognised. 
 
It is normal when building a model to think in terms of choosing interactions, but in 
doing so one is implicitly also choosing invariances. The choice of connections is an 
active one and the choice of eliminations a passive one. However, given the concept of 
a model as a simplification of reality, it would be more logical to make the choices the 
other way round, i.e. passively assume no invariances and actively eliminate possible 
interactions one by one, taking into account what is lost each time. One might 
characterise this as a "top down" approach as opposed to the normal "bottom up" one. 
 
The assumption implicit in the bottom up approach is that with every functional 
relation added, the model gets in some sense ‘better’. What is better (or worse) in 
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modelling terms is not always defined explicitly, but generally tends to appeal to the 
idea of accuracy. This is a back-justification of the first mentioned assumption; in the 
concept of accuracy is implicit the idea that a ‘perfect’ model exists, one that will 
generate numerical outputs which correspond to observed values within some pre-
specified error. These outputs may be phenomena clearly non-numerical and 
unobservable, such as the above example of benefits of a project, but the idea of 
accuracy is employed regardless. Even when the outputs of the model are observable 
quantities, the difference between the observed and calculated values, if they are due 
to qualitative misconceptions in the model, cannot be treated as merely numerical 
errors. The idea inherent in the bottom up approach is that as one adds more factors 
into the model, it will somehow converge to this ‘perfect’ model. It is logical to suppose 
that with the top down approach that elimination of factors (numerical or otherwise) 
will somehow diminish the representational power of a model, but the converse is not 
necessarily true with the bottom up one. There may not be some path-independent 
process that necessarily leads to an ideal point, but an infinity of possible paths 
diverging to quite different models. The idea of the model as an approximation of 
reality, without any recognition of the significance of ‘proximate’, persists however, 
and leads to us to the third fundamental assumption. 
 
C.- That which is not deterministic must be probabilistic 
 
This assumption relates to a way of disguising the previous two, by treating any 
numerical discrepancy between model and reality as mere random error. 
 
If the idea of ‘approximation’ is used to hide the assumption of the existence of 
algebraic relations, this is in turn hidden by the idea of the ‘error term’. The error term 
is supposedly a random term frequently added onto the end of equations to 
acknowledge the modeller’s ignorance of the real system. In the case where the 
equation calculates an observable quantity (i.e. not a fictitious variable such as utility, 
as in the below example) it is obviously tautological to say that the error term makes 
the equation numerically correct; given a sufficiently loose (and therefore 
meaningless) definition of the error term, any equation using one can represent any 
quantity correctly. The value of the error term therefore resides entirely in its precise 
definition. 
 
In the physical sciences, it is common for the error to appear in terms of limits. These 
limits describe uncertainty in the observations, which will translate into corresponding 
uncertainty in predictions. Probability appears when for a sufficiently large number of 
controlled experiments on an isolated system, observational errors due to limited 
precision of measurement or sampling error can be assumed to follow some 
distribution subject to the laws of probability. 
 
Now probability is a quantity which can only be defined under either one of two 
conditions: 
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(i) if one has an a-priori idea of equiprobable outcomes, based on knowledge of the 
system’s dynamics, e.g. if a coin has two equal faces, the probability of tossing heads 
equals 0.5. 
 
(ii) if one can perform a series of experiments in which the normalised distribution of 
the outcomes always tends to the same distribution. 
 
It ought to be obvious that in the social sciences, there are many phenomena which 
are not, at least at any observable level, deterministic. However, neither can one 
consider them probabilistic (at that level) unless one of these conditions holds. There 
are many instances, for example in economic theories (see example below) where 
although neither condition holds, the idea of probability is used to patch up 
conceptually contentious models. To deterministic and probabilistic must be added a 
third category of system, the indeterminate, whose definition depends on the 
observability of the system’s behaviour. At the level at which we observe social 
systems, non-deterministic does not therefore imply probabilistic. 
 
An argument commonly used for such use of the error term is that the error accounts 
for the modeller’s ignorance of the ‘exact’ value of a variable. However ignorance is no 
excuse for employing notions of probability in models - on the contrary the definition of 
a probability actually requires a-priori knowledge. An error term, where meaningful at 
all, cannot necessarily be assumed probabilistic. 
 
As an aside, many models using this concept of assumed probability, such as the logit 
model below analysed, are very often totally deterministic. Variables are assigned error 
terms with a fixed distribution, and an optimum outcome (referred to as the "most 
probable" outcome) calculated. This is merely a deterministic model with extra 
parameters, those describing the distributions assumed. To call it probabilistic without 
qualifying the assumptions made in using the word may be at least misleading, and 
possibly wrong. The outcome of such a model is always the same, unlike the 
unambiguously probabilistic type of model where the outcome depends on some 
random number generator called by the model. This latter class of model, exemplified 
by the already mentioned examples of the urban evolution model of Allen and Sanglier 
(1981) and the fractal growth model of Batty and Longley (1989), represents a 
genuine recognition of ignorance of the influence of small-scale events. This contrasts 
with that school of thought which assumes that these events result in, or are 
subservient to, macroscopic forces which always drive to model to some invariant 
optimum solution as calculated by maximum likelihood methods, e.g. Anas (1982, ch 
4). However, the difference between a random model and a model of randomness still 
fails to be recognised in many cases, such as in so-called "random utility" theory 
(Manski, 1977) or its complement "random bidding" theory (Lerman & Kern, 1983).  
 
The aforementioned idea of equilibrium is closely tied to that of probability. On the one 
hand it is explicitly a feature of the idea that (for example) an urban system will, like 
some isolated thermodynamic system, tend to some entropy-maximising ‘optimal’ 
state dependent on the probabilities assigned. Miyagi (1986) in fact shows a 
mathematical equivalence between random utility and entropic models. On the other 
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hand it is implicit in the assumption that probabilities exist. Given that no clear 
equiprobable outcomes exist for a given process, one needs to invoke condition (ii) 
above to be able to define a probability. Clearly, to be able to observe such 
probabilities, one would need to observe (or theoretically be able to observe) a 
tendency towards a steady state which is not influenced by external processes, i.e. an 
equilibrium state. The concept of probability therefore brings on board an implicit idea 
of equilibrium which may not always be recognised, or desired. 
    In summary therefore, far from being a catch-all assumption which corrects flaws in 
imperfect knowledge or a genuine recognition of observational errors, the use of 
probability brings with it a basket of other implicit assumptions which may well 
compound the conceptual error. 
 
 
5.- Example - the logit model 
 
As a means of illustrating the modelling process as represented by the aforementioned 
three canons, we shall consider here the conceptual development of a model 
commonly used to describe (among other things) urban localisation, the logit model of 
discrete choice. (See various examples in Webster et al, 1988). 
 
This typically has the form: 
 
     
where: pi is the ‘probability’ that the actor chooses option i, 
 
Uj is the expected ‘utility’ associated with option j, 
 
xj is a vector of attributes possessed by option j. 
 
The first assumption, that of quantifiability, is deployed in the creation of the utility 
variable - a classic example of the use of all 15 axioms without any apparent attempt 
at justification. In the formative debate on utility theory, Kaldor (1939, page 551) 
stated of the economist that, ". . . the scientific status of his prescriptions is 
unquestionable, provided that the basic postulate of economics, that each individual 
prefers more to less, a greater satisfaction to a lesser one, is granted," and this 
remains ingrained in current orthodoxy. 
 
The relations Kaldor invokes here, of more/less, greater/lesser, are relationships 
merely of ordering. Despite this, although utility is rarely assigned an actual value, it is 
typically treated as an algebraic variable, which implicitly therefore has a numerical 
value subject to arithmetic operations. Similarly to the case of ‘benefit’ given above, 
the supposition that at any given moment the options available to a person are in 
some way ordered according perceived ‘satisfaction’ is reasonable enough, but the 
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conceptual leap from ordering to quantification seems in general to be made 
unthinkingly. 
 
A good attempt at justifying this conceptual leap may be found in Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman (1985, pg. 39). Considering consumption bundles Qi = {q1, . . . , qn} where qk 
represents the quantity of good/service k, they define rational behaviour in terms of a 
"transitive preference ordering" of the form 
Qi ³ Qj & Qj ³ Qk Þ Qj ³ Qk (1) 
 
They deduce from this the existence of an ordinal utility function U = U(q1, . . . , qn) 
which (whilst correctly distinguishing it from a cardinal one) in their words, "expresses 
mathematically the consumer’s preferences and is unique up to an order preserving 
transformation" (page 40). 
 
What does this phrase "order preserving transformation" mean? It means that the 
preferences described by the transitive ordering (1) can be described by any function 
of the quantities q1, . . . , qn for which the corresponding values of U(Q
i) maintain the 
same order as in (1). This by implication includes numerical functions which fulfil this 
condition as a subset of these ordinal functions. However, in any given case, the 
existence of a numerical function of q1, . . . , qn displaying the same ordering as (1) is 
not the issue; this is in general a trivial matter. If the function U is cardinal, then so 
must be the corresponding transformation - the assumption has merely been shifted 
from the existence of the utility function to that of this transformation. For the model 
to be representative of real choices, the order would have to be further preserved 
under the process of aggregation and all the transformations in the model; this will not 
be guaranteed merely the by existence of such a function U. In this example therefore, 
the assumption is not eliminated, merely concealed within the nuances of the 
descriptive language employed. 
 
The second assumption, that of the interactions, manifests itself in the choice of 
attributes xj. Conversely, as stated above, this is also the choice of invariances, i.e. 
what attributes, quantitative of qualitative, are not included. 
 
Utility may be intuitively defined as the perceived satisfaction derivable from a given 
option. Given the subjectivity of ‘satisfaction’ it is inevitable that the definition relies 
somewhat on intuition. Therefore, intuition being the intrinsically holistic phenomenon 
that it is, it makes more sense to start with the intuitive concept and ask what one 
loses by subtraction than to try to construct ‘satisfaction’ from scratch. 
 
An appropriate metaphor might be finding out how a car works. A person who has no 
idea about mechanics might go about learning by two ways. Either they might piece by 
piece dismantle a vehicle, finding what properties are lost each time (the "top down" 
approach) or they might go to their local hardware store and try to build what they 
think is a car from the bits and pieces they find there (the "bottom up" approach). 
 
Most people would think the top-down method more sensible; however the bottom-up 
one appears to be the dominant paradigm in modelling. In terms of the car metaphor, 
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utility is would be equivalent to some variable (or perhaps a transformation of a 
variable) such as ‘car-ness’, which has a value of 1 for a complete vehicle and close to 
0 for most other objects. The bottom-up approach implicitly assumes that adding a 
further component to the assemblage will augment its car-ness, making it tend 
towards the limiting value of 1. However, this of course ignores the multi-dimensional 
nature of the functional relationships; adding a windscreen wiper to the glove box will 
not contribute to the authenticity of the vehicle. Likewise, adding more attributes to a 
utility function may not improve its representation of satisfaction. 
 
The same metaphor is also useful for illustrating the third assumption, that of random 
error. Imagining the motley assemblage of washing machine spares and garden 
implements which an incompetent modeller might have constructed to represent a car, 
the error term would be equivalent to a magic component which is capable of taking on 
any guise such that it ‘corrects’ the numerical difference between the "car-ness" of the 
assembly and 1. It of course cannot correct the inappropriateness of car-ness as a 
useful description of a car. 
 
In the present example, the logit model calculates ‘probabilities’ of different choices 
based on the assumption of a certain form for the error term attached to the utility 
function. This form however, the Gumbel (or Weibull) distribution, is not based on a-
priori knowledge of the utility; as Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985, pg. 104) state, "the 
assumption that the disturbances are Gumbel distributed . . . . is used only for reasons 
of analytic convenience." (The convenient property is that the maximum of a set of 
Gumbel-distributed variables is also Gumbel-distributed.) 
 
Thus the logit model cannot be said to calculate choice probabilities; rather it 
constitutes (in the discrete choice case) a partition function of individual choices, 
deterministically optimised over a set of fixed 'acceptability' functions (the Gumbel 
distributions, whose common dispersion parameter determines the sensitivity of the 
calibrated model to the dispersion of the data). 
 
This example serves to illustrate the anatomy of the modelling process. The purpose is 
not to rubbish the logit model; it makes no more nor less sense to say the model is 
"rubbish" than to say it is "accurate" or "correct". The intention is simply to shed some 
light on the interpretation process which is modelling. 
 
 
6.- What price a science of modelling? 
 
As argued above, claims of mathematical modelling to be scientific will always be 
debatable without deeper understanding of its basic premises. The hypothesis of this 
work, which requires a range of analysis and case studies far broader than is possible 
in any one paper, is that the three above identified assumptions between them 
underpin almost all modelling, and may be made unthinkingly. One is often expected 
to accept them without attempt at rigorous empirical justification of the model, as in 
the case of land-use models. Mere calibration on a specific case does not constitute 
justification of the assumptions employed; the model may thus become an economical 
 Painting by numbers. Mathematicals models of urban system. 
Pintando por números. Modelos matemáticos del sistema urbano. 
 
 
 
 
Revista de Urbanismo N°2 – Marzo de 2000  12 
 
description of the data but will still be a subjective one. Validation on an independent 
data set will improve the situation, but only if the data covers all possible situations for 
which the model might be used. In any science, the best a model can do is set limits of 
outcomes within known numerical error, and if the errors are qualitative or are due to 
unknown causes, limits cannot be set and the model can have no pretension to be 
either predictive or objective. 
 
Does it matter whether or not a model can be said to be objective or not? The answer 
is no - for as long as the model is not used to support planning decisions which 
influence people’s lives. In this case it becomes highly important that the model as a 
phenomenon be understood in its entirety, both in its derivation and its effects. Wachs 
(1985) discusses the use of models in planning in the light of such effects. The mere 
assertion that a model is the "best we have" does not justify its use in decision-
influencing without this understanding - in the absence of which the word "best" 
cannot be meaningful. 
 
A consciousness of urban systems involving modelling would therefore be unlikely to 
be simply a matter of numerical description; rather it would have to include: 
 
(i) a science of the process of observation and interpretation of the urban system, 
which seeks to actively discover the intrinsic gains and losses of the processes, and not 
passively ignore them. 
 
(ii) an understanding of the effects of the use of the model, via decision making, on 
the urban system itself. 
 
 
7. Which direction for modelling therefore? 
 
Currently, the common expectations for modelling are mainly restricted to the realm of 
technical development - increased  power and sophistication of computing equipment, 
better algorithms for solving numerical problems and so on. The orthodox answer to 
criticisms about modelling has thus become to state that in n years time we will be 
able to do it faster and better (the latter being an appeal again to the often spurious 
idea of accuracy). Most vocally amongst these is Openshaw (1994, 1995), but one 
might add Mills (1987, p711), Birkin et al (1995) and many others. Such technical 
advance is to be applauded, but ought not to be allowed to lead to a generation of 
modellers who have no deeper understanding of mathematics than the ability to 
manipulate formulae and program computers. To slip into the mentality of "we've done 
all the philosophy years ago, now there's just the numbers left to do" may simply lead 
to adding floors to a building without foundation. This is not to question the undoubted 
value of contributions such as the regularly cited Wilson (1970) or Domencich and 
McFadden (1975), merely to contend that their pleasing theoretical roundness does not 
necessarily mean that the "totality of the phenomenon [of urban activity] could be 
explained," as suggested by De la Barra (1995, page 250; this author's translation of 
quote). The fundamental debate must be kept open. 
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A problem in this is a certain stigma attached to subjectivity - a common perception 
being that subjectivity precludes any possibility of the existence of a science of 
planning. This perhaps represents a laudable desire for impartiality in planning, but 
impartiality is not the same as objectivity. A person who supports neither team in a 
drawn football match may be impartial, but their opinion about which team was better 
would still be subjective, depending on aesthetic preferences of style, seating position 
in the stadium etc. Equally, a modeller might have no preference for model A or model 
B on technical grounds, but if the assumptions made in the two are different, there is 
still a subjective choice to be made, which may have unforseen consequences in 
resultant planning decisions. However, if this subjectivity in itself becomes a legitimate 
subject for study, there is no reason why a science of some sort should not be 
possible. 
 
Modelling of social systems must therefore embrace subjectivity, not just as a 
necessary evil, but as a positive asset, as in the arts. The more that modelling is 
perceived an occult activity pursued by a select group of specialists shielding their 
arcane ‘knowledge’ from the public eye, the more it is likely to be criticised as elitist 
and anti-democratic.  
 
This phenomenon may extend well beyond the realm of urban planning; there exists a 
wealth of literature, typified by the popular contribution of Capra (1982), alleging a 
domination of politics by so-called "economism" of a highly mechanistic, and 
unsustainable, nature. Economism, by which is here meant the metaphysical belief 
system which connects human emotion and desire to highly complex mathematical 
descriptions of international commerce, may well be seen to be founded in the same 
three canons - this is left for speculation. 
 
The foregoing discussion leads to two principal recommendations: 
 
(1) That a fundamental requirement of a model is that it be transparent, i.e. that all 
the assumptions made be recognised and presented as an integral part of any results 
quoted from the model, and their influence over those results understood where 
possible. 
 
(2) That the value of a model as a planning tool be judged on its ethical effects as part 
of the whole decision-making process, not on unsupported considerations of technical 
merit. 
 
Perhaps a cue could be taken from visual forms of modelling, as employed in 
architecture or more participative forms of urban planning. Be it in 2 or 3 dimensions, 
a visual simulation is a perfectly transparent representation of a reality existent or 
projected. The assumptions are there for all to see - if the cars in an artist’s impression 
of an urban motorway appear six inches high compared to the happy pedestrians, one 
can laugh and say that the artist must have shares in a road construction company. If 
one sees nothing but a mysterious number labelled ‘benefit’ one can say nothing. 
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If mathematical modelling means that the artists paint by numbers, so be it. The 
numbers however must not remain hidden by a glossy top coat. 
 
 
Acknowledgement  
 
The author wishes to recognise the support of FONDECYT(Chile)project number 
1960731, for funding the development of the research which gave rise to these ideas. 
 
 
References 
 
ALLEN, P.M. and Sanglier, M, 1981, "Urban evolution, self-organization and decision 
making" Environment and Planning A 13, p167. 
 
ANAS, A, 1982, Residential Location Markets and Urban Transportation. Economic 
Theory, Econometrics and Policy Analysis with Discrete Choice Models. (Academic 
Press, NY.) 
 
BATTY, M. and Longley, P.A. (1989). "Urban growth and form: scaling, fractal 
geometry, and diffusion-limited aggregation." Environment. and Planning A 21, p1447. 
 
BEN-AKIVA, M. and Lerman, S, 1985, Discrete Choice Analysis. Theory and Application 
to Travel Demand. (MIT, Mass.) 
 
BIRKIN, M, Clarke, M. and George, F, 1995. "The use of parallel computers to solve 
non-linear spatial optimization problems: an application to network planning." 
Environment and Planning A, 27, pp1049-1068. 
 
CAPRA, F, 1982. The Turning Point; Science, society and the rising culture. Wildwood 
House. 
 
DE LA BARRA, T, Perez, B, Y Añez, J, 1995. "Avances Recientes en la Modelación 
Integrada de Usos del Suelo y Transportes Multimodales." Proceedings the 7th Chilean 
Conference of Transport Engineering, Santiago 10/95. Ed. F J Martínez (SOCHITRAN, 
Santiago de Chile) pp 248-262. 
 
DOMENCICH, T.A. & McFadden, P, 1975. Urban Travel Demand: a Behavioural 
Analysis. (North Holland, Amsterdam.). 
 
KALDOR, N, 1939, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons 
of Utility" The Economics Journal 46 (195) 549-552. 
 
KLOSTERMANN, R, 1994. "Large-Scale Urban Models. Retrospect and Prospect." 
Journal of the American Planning Association 60 (1), 3-6. 
 
 Painting by numbers. Mathematicals models of urban system. 
Pintando por números. Modelos matemáticos del sistema urbano. 
 
 
 
 
Revista de Urbanismo N°2 – Marzo de 2000  15 
 
LEE, D. B. 1973. "Requiem for Large Scale Models." Journal of the American Planning 
Association 39 163-178. 
 
LERMAN, S. R, and Kern, C. R, 1983. "Hedonic Theory, Bid Rents, and Willingness- to-
Pay: Some Extensions of Ellikson's Results." Journal of Urban Economics. 13 358-363. 
 
MACKETT, R.L, 1993. "Structure of Linkages Between Transport and Land Use." 
Transportation Research B, 27B 189-206. 
 
MANSKI, C, 1977. "The Structure of Random Utility Models." Theory and Decision 8 
229-254. 
 
MILLS, E.S, 1987. Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Vol II. North Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
 
MIYAGI, T, 1986. On the Formulation of a Stochastic User Equilibrium Model Consistent 
With the Random Utility Theory - A Conjugate Dual Approach. Proceedings of the 4th 
World Conference on Transport Research, pp 1619-1635. 
 
OPENSHAW, S, 1994. "Computational human geography: towards a research agenda." 
Environment and Planning A, 26 499-508. 
 
OPENSHAW, S, 1995. "Human systems modelling as a grand new challenge area in 
science." Environment and Planning A, 27 159-164. 
 
SHEPPARD, E, 1995. "Sleeping with the enemy, or keeping the conversation going?" 
Environment and Planning B, 27(7) 1026-1028. 
 
TRIBE, L, 1972. "Policy Science: analysis or ideology?" Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 
(1) 66-110. 
 
WACHS, M, 1985. "Planning, Organisations and Decision-Making: A Research Agenda." 
Transportation Research 19A 521. 
 
WEBSTER, F.V, Bly, P.H. and Paulley, N.J, (Eds.), 1988, Urban Land-use and Transport 
Interaction. (Gower, Aldershot.) 
 
WEGENER, M, 1994. "Operational Urban Models. State of the Art." Journal of the 
American Planning Association 60 (1) 17-29. 
 
WILSON, A.G, 1970. Entropy in Urban and Regional Modelling. (London, Pion Press.). 
 
 
Note: Article published in the journal Environment and Planning B, volume 25, 1998, pages 483-493. (This 
version of the paper was edited from an original electronic file according to proof corrections delivered in 
hardcopy. It is thus possible that there are some small discrepancies with the version published in 
Environment and Planning B.) 
